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27 May 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, O/BPAM

SUBJECT: Advanced Planning

1. As agreed at yesterday's meeting on the 15 year intelligence plan, I attach herewith a SIGINT example which, of course, would not fall under "substantive intelligence objectives" but is an objective which the Intelligence Community must attempt to achieve in the SIGINT field in the national interest.

2. I am also sending you as an attachment a brief summary statement of the way we view the SIGINT future during the next 15 years. This could be included as a foreword to SIGINT as a collection system. This would be intended to give the reader a better understanding of some of the issues involved and, in a sense, a condensed justification for the programs which would be needed to maintain SIGINT as a viable collection system.

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HUNTINGTON D. SHELDON  
CIA SIGINT Officer

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DD/S&T

26 May 1965

To: DD/S&T

SUBJECT: Advanced Planning Progress Report

1. The current effort to develop a fifteen-year plan is now moving ahead, but with a somewhat less ambitious target date. A skeleton of this plan will be provided to the DCI on Friday, 28 May 1965, and DD/S&T thinking has been reflected throughout in this. What will remain is the problem of filling out this skeleton with special programs, manpower and dollar levels.

2. The present shape of this plan follows the general outline we developed for our own forecasting. It consists of three major sections:

- a. Assumptions about the future
- b. Major intelligence objectives
- c. Programs to meet these objectives.

3. Assumptions about the Future.

Sherman Kent has tried to construct a forecast for the future course of events in the world as they affect the vital interests of the U. S. A one-page summary of his forecast is included here for your information:

ASSUMPTIONS

1966 - 1970

The world will be comprised of a few power centers with a high level of tension.

The real power centers are likely to remain the U. S. and the USSR.

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For the short-term at least, there will be a high degree of tension between the U. S. and CHINA, growing tension between the U. S. and Russia. However, the force of mutual deterrence will make the coming of all-out war between the U. S. and the USSR highly unlikely.

Chinese nuclear capabilities will almost certainly not have grown to the point where the Chinese could contemplate a nuclear attack on the U. S. or its allies.

A substantial non-nuclear armed conflict with China is possible. Should this occur, world tensions would remain high and the risks of general nuclear war by miscalculation would rise appreciably.

#### ASSUMPTIONS

1971 - 1980

We must assume a growth in the number of power centers. Unless nascent Chinese nuclear capabilities are destroyed in the preceding period, Peiping will be very much in the Big League in Asia and perhaps elsewhere.



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This will obviously need to be amplified and DDI is now working on this problem.

To such a general statement, we would add the following specific assumptions which have a strong influence on our activities:

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- A a. The Soviet strategic threat will shift almost completely to hardened missiles. There will be a steady decline in manned bomber forces, and a gradual increase in missile firing submarine capabilities.
- A b. Soviet space programs will continue to grow, with a trend toward manned orbital and lunar missions. Other nations will enter the space field in a serious way during this period, probably only via unmanned missions. Actual hostilities in space are possible toward the end of this period.
- A c. The Soviet ABM programs will continue to flourish and expand, posing a real defense to our own offensive capability.
- A d. A Soviet anti-satellite system will be perfected and used to deny us orbital photography in the next five years, unless suitable counter-measures are taken.
- A e. Proliferation of modern weapons (nuclear, missiles, bombers, CW and BW) will proceed at an increasing rate, based both on native capabilities and external technological support. Testing of these weapons will be done in many areas but probably not frequently by any one nation.
- A f. Explosive situations will continue to erupt around the world at a steady and possibly increasing clip, such as Cyprus, South Vietnam, Dominican Republic, Berlin, etc.



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A h. Communications within and between all countries will increase steadily and perhaps begin to accelerate.

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A i. The flow of all types of information into the intelligence community will accelerate in the same way as worldwide communications do generally. ✓

We have not made assumptions on a number of other key questions which affect the future of intelligence, but feel that we should consider the impact of:

- j. US/USSR cooperation in space programs?
- k. Tendency toward release of intelligence information for political advantage? (i.e., space failures)
- l. Increasing sophistication of foreign intelligence services?
- m. Possibility of US/USSR intelligence exchanges or other quite startling rearrangements of the present pattern of intelligence relationships?

Lastly, we are convinced that we cannot and should not preclude:

n. A major technological breakthrough which might have a dramatic effect on the strategic or tactical balance of the major powers.

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Notice that almost none of the above carries a time estimate, and this refinement is one of the tasks before us.

4. Major Intelligence Objectives:

This grouping was termed "planning needs" in our previous discussions, but now relates to a much broader class. The Clarke working group has broken this down into five basic sections:

- a. Intelligence Production
- b. Intelligence Collection
- c. Information Processing & ADP
- d. Covert Action
- e. Program Planning and Support

All of the planning needs we recognized can be fitted into one of these categories. In our sessions, we came up with the following needs:


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During the past year and a half to two years, the DCI, with the assistance of a small staff, has taken several significant steps in furtherance of his responsibility for coordinating and guiding effectively the total United States foreign intelligence effort.

Among these have been:

- a. The strengthening of a number of USIB committees and of other community coordination entities.
- b. Participation, with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research & Engineering) in a review of requirements for communications intelligence, for the purpose of establishing means by which the United States Intelligence Board(USIB) can eventually begin the identification of selective choices in this field.
- c. Provision of representation on behalf of the DCI in the review of DOD intelligence programs such as the Consolidated Intelligence Program (CIP) and the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP).
- d. Sponsoring of a series of surveys of representative intelligence activities (e.g., th  Reports).

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e. In coordination with DIA beginning to explore means of establishing compatible categories of intelligence facilities and assets so as to make possible an over-all listing of these facilities and assets throughout the community.

f. A number of other similar or related undertakings.

These measures, useful though they have been, represent essentially only first steps toward putting the DCI in a position to discharge his full responsibility for coordination and direction of the community. Development of the proposed Fifteen Year Plan will be another major step toward this goal.

Plan For A Plan

Objectives:

1. Develop a basic structure, in substantive terms (targets / products), for community use in:
  - a. Stating capability objectives
  - b. Stating requirements for:
    - (1) Production resources.
    - (2) Collection and processing resources.
  - c. Recapitulating available resources.
    - (1) Production resources by function (early warning, current intelligence, and maintenance of the intelligence base) at national, departmental and field echelons.
    - (2) Collection and processing resources by type, e.g., photographic reconnaissance, SIGINT, espionage, and overt sources.
  - d. Identifying intelligence products.
  - e. Evaluating the degree by which approved requirements are met.
  - f. Projecting resource needs, including costing in terms of manpower, equipment and facilities.

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2. Develop the means and practice of stating meaningful requirements for the guidance of managers of collection and processing resources.

3. Develop the means for evaluating the degree by which requirements pertinent to a particular category of collection and processing resource are being met.

4. Develop compatible programming systems and techniques (using 5, 10, 15 year projections) by which programs proposed by managers of resources can be evaluated in terms of approved objectives and requirements, and in terms of the evaluation of products.

5. Develop intra-community understanding of the need for the above objectives, and make the necessary arrangements with the heads of departments and agencies involved, including the identification of any new statutory or Presidential authority that may be needed.

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